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Abstract 
 
Sales are a widespread and well-known phenomenon that has been documented in several 
product markets. Regularities in such periodic price reductions appear to suggest that the 
phenomenon cannot be entirely attributed to random variations in supply, demand, or the 
aggregate price level. Certain sales are traditional and so well publicized that it is difficult 
to justify them as devices to separate informed from uninformed consumers.  This paper 
presents a model in which sellers want to reduce prices periodically in order to improve 
their ability to collude over time. In particular, the study shows that if buyers have 
heterogeneous storage technologies, periodic sales may facilitate collusion by magnifying 
intertemporal linking in consumers’ decisions. The stability and the profitability of 
different sale strategies is then explored. The optimal sales discount and timing of sales 
are characterized. A trade-off between cartel size and aggregate profits arises. 
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1 Introduction
The occurrence of periodic price reductions, or sales, on a variety of items is a pervasive and
well-known microeconomic phenomenon that has been documented in several product markets.
Typically, a high prices are charged in most periods, but occasionally prices are cut to supply
more units to a potentially larger group of consumers. The regular occurrence of such phenom-
enon appears to suggest that sales cannot be entirely explained by random variations in supply,
demand, or the aggregate price level. Moreover, certain sale periods are traditional and so well
publicized that it is di¢ cult to justify them as devices to separate informed from uninformed
consumers. A growing empirical literature also, appears to suggest that the majority of peri-
odic sales take place for products that are fairly storable, and that storage capacity explains in
part the responsiveness of consumers to changes in prices (Bell and Hilber 2006, Hendel and
Nevo 2006 & 2010, Erdem et al 2003, Seiler 2010). Such evidence highlights the primary role
that storage constraints may play in determining consumerspurchasing behavior and thus,
retailerspricing decisions.
The present paper studies how sale strategies may foster collusion in a market in which goods
can be stored. Thus the aim of the study is to provide an additional motive for rms to engage in
sale strategies and to shed light on the optimal sales discount and timing. While factors such as
informational di¤erences and heterogeneity in willingness to search or pay have received notable
attention, the theoretical literature on storage constraints remains scarce despite empirical
relevance documented by a growing literature. Notable exceptions are Salop and Stiglitz 1982,
Hong, McAfee and Nayyar, 2002, and Dudine, Hendel and Lizzeri 2006.
We consider an industry in which in every period, n rms produce a homogeneous storable
good, and sell it to a mass of heterogeneous consumers with unit demand. Consumers di¤er
only by their access to storage. In particular, we restrict attention to economies with two
types of consumers: those without storage capacity, and those with storage capacity S.1 In
this context, we examine the e¤ects of heterogeneous storage technologies on rmsincentives
to hold periodic sales to support a greater degree of cooperation among rms in a repeated
competition setting. Sale strategies will be characterized by a regular price, by a price mark-
1The paper assumes that consumers are small and unable to establish reputations. See Nolke and White
2007 for the case of strategic buyers with interdependent demands.
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down (on the regular price) and by the frequency of sales. We show that periodic sale strategies
sustained by grim trigger punishments allow rms to collude on signicant prot levels even
when standard no-sale strategies cannot sustain collusion at such prot levels. In such an
environment sale strategies may strengthen collusion, as the storage technology intertemporally
links consumer demand and thus, reduces the short-run gains from a deviation. In particular,
in any such equilibrium rms will charge, in any period of sales, a big enough discount to
induce all consumers with open storage capacity to stockpile a quantity su¢ cient to satisfy
all their demand until the next sale. Such behavior reduces incentives to deviate in regular
price periods, as only consumers without storage purchase units in such periods. Moreover, the
incentives to deviate also, decline in periods with sales both because a lower price is charged
in such periods, and because consumers with storage reduce their demand when a deviation is
observed in the wake of the imminent price war (implied by the grim trigger punishments).
Often we will refer to the incentives not to deviate from an equilibrium strategy as the
stability of a strategy. The rst part of the analysis: characterizes consumer demand for the
proposed environment; characterizes the set E of sale strategies which are more stable than any
strategy without sales; and provides necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the non-emptiness
of such a set. The second part of the analysis restricts attention to the case of single-unit
storage and characterizes the most stable and the most protable sale strategies in the set E .
Within such set a trade-o¤ is proven to emerge between collusive prots and stability (which
is measured by the maximal number of rms that can collude on given prots). Such trade-o¤
is explicitly characterized. The second part of the analysis concludes by studying how such
trade-o¤ is a¤ected by changes in the environment. In particular, increases in patience (i.e.
the frequency of interaction) will lead both to larger cartels at any prot level and to the
persistence of the prot-stability trade-o¤ for a larger range of prots. An increase in the
protability of a market instead, will increase both cartel size at intermediate prot levels
and the range of prots for which the prot-stability trade-o¤ persists. A larger fraction of
consumers without storage will have ambiguous e¤ects on cartel size at high prot levels and
will reduce the maximal cartel size at low prot levels. In general, the e¤ect of such a change
will remain ambiguous, as a large fraction of consumer with storage could reduce equilibrium
prots due to the cost of anticipating production. However, the range of prots for which the
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prot-stability trade-o¤ exists will be proven to decline in the fraction of consumers without
storage. Relationship between the optimal sale markdown and the environment will also be
explored. The nal part of the analysis consists of two extensions. The rst extension considers
the multi-unit storage scenario, characterizes the optimal timing of sales, and highlights that
access to multi-unit storage technologies can reduce the prot-stability trade-o¤. The second
extension shows that sales do not need to be synchronized when rms compete in multiple
markets.
Note the in the proposed model collusion is strengthened at the expense of aggregate prots,
since deviation prots decline more than equilibrium prots when sale strategies are employed.
Aggregate prots must decline in the proposed setup, since all consumers are homogeneous in
their willingness to pay. Note however, that if consumers with higher storage capacity had a
lower willingness to pay, a sale strategy may achieve higher prots than the no-sale strategy by
price discriminating among di¤erent types of consumers, and thus foster collusion even further.
We have elected to keep valuations homogeneous across consumers in order to display more
explicitly the e¤ects of the intertemporal linking in consumer demand.
Literature Review: One of the rst theoretical explanations for sales relates consumer search
behavior to price discrimination. Two prominent examples in this literature are Varian 1980
and Salop and Stiglitz 1982. Varian 1980 argues that in the presence heterogeneously informed
consumers, retail price variations can arise as a natural outcome of mixed strategy equilibrium
in which rms price discriminate consumers with di¤erent information. Salop and Stiglitz
1982 instead, considers a model with search costs in which consumers are imperfectly informed
about the prices charged by stores and di¤er in their ability to stockpile. In such framework
the authors show that stores have incentives to hold unannounced sales to induce consumers to
purchase future consumption. Both models however, are essentially static models and cannot
account for correlation in prices. Even though the random sales feature remains a compelling
explanation for some erratic price behavior, it appears less suited to account for many of the
documented retail markdowns that are predictable, publicly know, and take place in most stores
simultaneously (Pesendofer 2002 and Warner and Barsky 1995).
The appealing fashion/clearance paradigm for sales (Lazear 1986, Pashigian 1988, and
Pashigian and Bowen 1991) can also, hardly be applied to a wide variety of retail items for
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which the fashion hypothesis appears a priori less appropriate (either because the items are
homogeneous, or because styles change little over time).
A nal relevant literature has motivated sales as a form of intertemporal price discrimi-
nation (Conlisk, Gerstner and Sobel 1984, Hendel and Nevo 2010, Hong, McAfee and Nayyar
2002, Narasimhan and Jeuland 1985, Sobel 1984). Conlisk, Gerstner and Sobel 1984, and in
particular Sobel 1984 study the incentives to hold cyclical simultaneous sales as a means of
price discrimination in a durable-good environment. In most periods, prices are kept high to
extract surplus from high value consumers, but periodically prices are decreased in order to
sell to a larger group of consumers with lower reservation values. A key assumption to gen-
erate such price cycles is the constant inow of new heterogeneous consumers in the market.
Hendel and Nevo 2010, Hong, McAfee and Nayyar 2002, Narasimhan and Jeuland 1985, study
the incentives to hold periodic sales in a market with storable goods and heterogeneous con-
sumers. In this setup, the incentives to price discriminate consumers over time with sales fully
explained by the positive correlation between storage costs and consumerswillingness to pay.
We complement these papers by o¤ering a new explanation for the existence of sale strategies
in a dynamic storable goods model in which the incentives to hold periodic sales arises even
in the absence of such a correlation. Moreover, as in Sobel 1984, we characterize the optimal
timing for sales.
The paper is also, closely related to several studies which pointed out importance of the
intertemporal linking in decisions to explain collusive behavior (Ausubel and Deneckere 1987,
Dana and Fong 2010, Gul 1987, Schiraldi and Nava 2010).
Roadmap: Section 2 introduces the model, denes the relevant class of sale strategies, and
presents several preliminary results comparing di¤erent classes of sale strategies in terms of
their stability. Section 3 restricts attention to a model with unit-storage. For that setup two
relevant sale strategies are characterized. Namely, the most stable sale strategy and the most
protable sale strategy in E . The section concludes with the full characterization of the prot-
stability trade-o¤ that di¤erent sale strategies entail. Comparative static results show how the
trade-o¤ is a¤ected by changes in patience, in protability and in the fraction of consumers with
access to storage. Section 4 extends the baseline model in two directions. The rst considers
the general model with multi-unit storage and again characterizes the most stable and most
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protable sale strategies in such a more general framework. It will be shown that sale strategies
with infrequent sales may be increase both stability and prots, and may thus, alleviate the
trade-o¤. The second extension shows why synchronization in sales is not necessary when
rms operate in several markets. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are relegated to appendix A.
Appendix B contains several useful derivations omitted from the main text for clarity.
2 A Model with Storable Goods
This section rst introduces a simple economy with storage, denes the class of sale strategies
that will be analyzed throughout the paper, and develops several preliminary results on stability.
The Simple Economy with Storage
Consider an innite-horizon discrete-time model with innitely lived produces and consumers.
Suppose that two goods are traded in the model which we shall refer to as consumption q and
money m. In each period, all consumers are endowed with a large amount of money M and
with no consumption. The preferences of a consumer are separable over the two goods and
satisfy:
u(q;m) =
8<: v +m if q  1m if q < 1
Hence, the marginal value of consumption is v for the rst unit consumed and 0 for any
additional unit consumed. The budget constraint faced by each consumer in every period
requires that:
m = M   p
where p denotes the amount of money spent on consumption good. All consumers discount the
future at a common factor , and their time-preferences over utility sequences futg1t=0 satisfy:
(1  )
X1
t=0
tut
There is a unit measure of consumers. Consumers di¤er only in their ability to store the
consumption good. In particular, assume that a fraction 0 of the consumers is unable to store
goods, while a fraction S can store up to S additional units of consumption. Such units do
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not depreciate, when stored and can be consumed in any future period.
A nite set of rms, N with cardinality n, supplies consumption good to this market.
All rms have a common constant marginal cost of producing consumption good, c. If p =
(p1; :::; pn) are the prices set by each rm on the units of consumption sold, and if d(p) denotes
the aggregate demand at such prices, the individual demand faced by rm i satises:
di(p) =
8<:
1
jarg minj2N pjjd(p) if pi  minj2N pj
0 if pi > minj2N pj
The stage prot of rm i 2 N given a price vector p satises:
vi(p) = (pi   c)di(p)
All rms discount the future at a common factor , and their time-preferences over prot
sequences fvtg1t=0 satisfy:
(1  )
X1
t=0
tvt
Sale Strategies and Equilibrium
Firms and consumers observe all the prices quoted in the market in all previous periods. Thus,
the set of possible histories in the induced game can be dened as:
H = f;g [ f[1t=1
ts=1Rn+g
A rms strategy maps histories into a price quoted at a given date. Consumers use the
information about past quoted prices and the equilibrium strategy of the rms to form beliefs
about future prices in the economy. Since consumers are small we shall assume that their
individual decisions are unobservable to any other individual. Consumers will thus, decide
how many units to purchase from rms quoting the lowest price, just so to maximize their
individual payo¤. In particular, consider any sequence of future prices pt = fpzg1z=t. Let
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pz = mini2N fpizg denote the market price in period z, and let:
T (pt) = min z subject to pt > 
zpt+z
denote how long a consumer has to wait before the current market price exceeds the future
discounted price. The next proposition pins down consumer demand for the proposed environ-
ment.
Remark 1 If pz  v in any period z  0, the demand for consumption good at time t:
(1) by consumers without storage technology satises d0(pt) = 1;
(2) by consumers with storage technology and with s units already in storage satises:
dS(s;p
t) = max

min

T (pt); S + 1
	  s; 0	
This is the case since consumers with access to storage purchase multiple units only if they
perceive the storage cost  to be smaller than the cost of future price increases.2 Since buyers
cannot build reputations, all consumers of the same type purchase the same number of units
in each period. Hence, the aggregate demand in a period in which all consumers with storage
have the same number of units s satises:
d(s;pt) = 0 + SdS(s;p
t)
The equilibrium strategies that will be analyzed throughout the paper discipline deviations as
trigger-strategies would. However, equilibrium prices will vary along the equilibrium path. In
particular, consider any strategy in which all rms set prices along the equilibrium path so that
for some { 2 f2; 3; :::g:
pt =
8<: (1 + )c if mod(t;{) 6= 0(1 + )c if mod(t;{) = 0
where mod(t;{) 6= 0 denotes the { modulo of the time period t. Such strategy may be
interpreted as a cyclical sales policy in which all rms jointly reduce prices every { periods,
where  denotes the markup in periods without sales, and where  2 [0; 1] denotes the fraction of
2The cost of storage coincides with the discount factor, as the rate of time preferences represents the oppor-
tunity cost of spending money sooner to stock units.
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such a markup charged during sale periods. Deviations from the equilibrium path are punished
via reversion to competitive pricing in each future time period. In particular, for any history
ht 2 H of length t, all the sale strategies that will be considered will satisfy:
(ht) =
8<: pt if piz = pz for any i and any z  tc if otherwise
The equilibrium punishment strategy is Nash in any subgame in which a deviation has already
occurred, since no rm can benet from a deviation when all the other rms are pricing com-
petitively. Thus, the incentives to comply with a sale strategy will be pinned down by looking
only at deviations from the equilibrium path. Let t() denote the aggregate payo¤ on the
equilibrium path, let t() denote the payo¤ of the most protable deviation from the equi-
librium path, and let the ratio of equilibrium to deviation prots, t=t, be denoted by Rt().
The following result characterizes the upper-bound on cartel size for which the proposed sale
strategy constitutes a Subgame Perfect equilibrium.
Remark 2 A sale strategy  is a SPE of the innite repetition of the game if and only if:
n  1
1  Rt() for any t  0 (1)
The upper-bound on the population size disciplines the largest number of rms that can sustain
strategy  as a subgame perfect equilibrium. Note that for any strategy without sales (and
thus without storage) such condition would simplify to the common requirement n  1
1  .
Throughout, we will refer to the strategies dened in this section as sale strategies. Any one
of these strategies will be completely pinned down by the three parameters: the sales discount
, the regular markup , and the frequency of sales {. The set of possible sale strategies will be
denoted by S =  0; v c
c
 [0; 1]f2; 3; :::g. The upper-bound imposed on the markup requires
consumers without storage to be willing to trade in periods without sales. Such restriction
is imposed, since any strategy with a higher markup could not be optimal for prots and for
stability. Similar considerations show why relaxing any one of the other bounds on S would
not a¤ect any of results developed in what follows.
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Preliminary Results on Stability & Prots
This sub-section develops several preliminary results that compare di¤erent sale strategies in
S in terms of prots and stability. Necessary and su¢ cient condition for a strategy with sales
to be more stable than a strategy without sales are presented. Necessary and su¢ cient for
the existence of such sale strategies are also presented. To this end, let us begin with a two
denitions clarifying the intent of our comparison.
Denition 1 A sale strategy  2 S is said to be more stable than strategy 0 if:
mint0Rt()  mint0Rt(0)
Denition 2 A sale strategy  2 S is said to raise more prots than strategy 0 if:
0()  0(0)
Note that for a xed discount factor , the denition of stability compares any two strategies
by looking at the largest number of rms n() that can collude on strategy :
n() =
mint0Rt()
1  
An alternative, but similar, denition of stability may involve the oor of the map n(). But
similar conclusions would hold. Alternatively, one could focus on the the lowest possible dis-
count factor () needed to collude on strategy  in a population of xed size n. To do so a
xed point argument would have to be employed to solve for:
() = 1  mint0Rt(j())
n
We refrain from doing so and instead, focus on n(), since the analysis simplies considerably
while the qualitative results coincide.
In order to compare the stability of two sale strategies, the equilibrium and deviation prots
must be expressed in terms of the parameters of the strategy. Recursively dene the equilibrium
10
demand dt and storage st in each period t  0 as follows:
d0 = d(0;p
0) & dS0 = dS(0;p0) & s1 = dS0   1
dt = d(st;p
t) & dSt = dS(st;pt) & st+1 = st + dSt   1
The next remark shows that any sale strategy is cyclical, and that it is without loss to consider
only the rst { periods to characterize the entire stream of payo¤s.
Remark 3 If mod(t;{) = 0, st = 0. If mod(t;{) = mod(z;{), dt = dz.
The claim follows from the properties of the equilibrium pricing path p and of the map
dS(st;p
t). It requires consumers not to have any units stored in periods of sale and thus,
to have the same demand at congruent dates in the cycle. Thus, for:
S(t) =
8<: 0 if mod(t;{) = 0{  mod(t;{) if mod(t;{) 6= 0
equilibrium payo¤s must satisfy for t = f1; :::;{   1g:
t() =
(1  )
1  {
P{ 1
z=0 
zvt+z(p
t+z) =
=
(1  )
1  {
hP{ 1
z=0 
zdt+z
  (1  )S(t)d0ic
Since a deviation to price y 6= pt at stage t leads to a conjectured price path yt =
 
(y;p it); c; c; c; :::

,
for y < pt the deviation payo¤s at each stage must satisfy:
t(y; ) = (y   c)d(st;yt)
For convenience, let us dene four classes of sale strategies for which all preliminary results will
be developed:
Denition 3 Let N  S denote those strategies such that  = 1.
Let V  S denote those strategies for which dt > 0 and mod(t;{) 6= 0 for some t.
Let C  S denote those strategies for which {  S + 1 and (1 + )  { 1 (1 + ).
Let E  C denote those strategies for which 0{S+0  .
11
The set N consists of all those sale strategies for which no discount is ever o¤ered along the
equilibrium path. The set V comprises all those strategies for which there is a period along the
equilibrium path with no sales and unit demand. The set C instead, will be proven to consists
of all those strategies in which consumers with access to storage purchase only in periods with
sales. The rest of the section proves that E comprises all the sale strategies which are more
stable than a strategy without sales, and provides necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the
non-emptiness of E .
The next proposition presents several introductory results on the stability and the prof-
itability of di¤erent sale strategies. In particular, it shows that V and C partition S and that
any sale strategy in which consumers with storage purchase units during a no-sales period is
dominated both in terms of prots and in terms of stability by a policy in which no sales ever
take place. Such a result considerably simplies the analysis of the prot-stability trade-o¤.
The latter observation will be exploited to characterize the set of sale strategies that can be
more stable than the revenue maximizing no-sales policy,  = v c
c
and  = 1.
Proposition 4 The following claims must hold:
(1) SnC = V
(2) N  V
(3) any strategy in N is more stable than any strategy in V;
(4) any strategy that sets  = v c
c
and  = 1 is prot maximizing within S;
(5) for any strategy in C, st = S(t) and:
dt =
8<: 0 + {S if mod(t;{) = 00 if mod(t;{) 6= 0
The proposition proves that V and C partition the set of sale strategies. Moreover, it implies
that all strategies with no sales (i.e. strategies in N ) are equally stable and more stable than
any other sale strategy in which consumers with storage purchase units in periods of sales (i.e.
strategies in V). This should also, clarify why sales where assumed to take place in the initial
period, since any sale strategy violating such a requirement would belong to V. The last part of
the proposition considerably simplies the expression of the equilibrium payo¤s for any strategy
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in C. In particular, for any  2 C we get:
t() =

0 +
1  
1  { 
S(t) [(xS + 0)  0]

c
The lemma also, pins down the revenue maximizing deviations for such candidate strategies:
t() = max
y
t(y; ) =
8<: c if mod(t;{) = 00c if mod(t;{) 6= 0
and the corresponding prot ratios:
Rt() =
8<:
0

+ 1 
1 x

({S + 0)  0

if mod(t;{) = 0
1 + 1 
1 { 
S(t)
h
({S + 0) 0   1
i
if mod(t;{) 6= 0
The next table displays the e¤ects of marginal changes in the sale strategy on equilibrium and
deviation prots and their ratio:
d d d{
dt() > 0 > 0 ?
dt()  0  0 0
dRt() 0 ? ?
The sign of dRt()=d is unspecied, since it is negative if mod(t;{) = 0 and positive oth-
erwise. The signs of d1()=d{ and dR1()=d{ coincide. In particular, such derivatives are
positive either if mod(t;{) = 0, or if mod(t;{) 6= 0 and the fraction of consumers with stor-
age is su¢ ciently small, and negative otherwise. Appendix B contains the derivation of these
derivatives and their signs.
As proven in the next proposition, whenever a strategy belongs C it is without loss to ignore
all, but the rst two periods, in order to characterize its stability. Such conclusion coupled
with the observation that mintRt() is independent of  and single peaked in  for any given
{, implies all strategies in E must be more stable than a strategy with no sales.
Proposition 5 Any strategy in E is more stable than any strategy in SnE.
Therefore, whenever the set E is non-empty sale strategies exist that are more stable than
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strategies without sales. It is easy to observe that a strategy  in E will be strictly more stable
than a strategy without sales if and only if:
 2

0
S{ + 0
;
+ 1

{ 1   1


Such expression and the previous result can be exploited to derive necessary and su¢ cient
conditions for the set E to be non-empty.
Corollary 6 E contains a strategy with a cycle of length { 2 f2; :::; S + 1g if and only if:
{ 1  v   c
v
0
{   0({   1) +
c
v
Thus, if   v c
v
0
2 0 +
c
v
, then E is non-empty.
Such conditions jointly discipline the all free parameters of the model, namely: the fraction of
consumers with storage 0, the protability of the market v  c, and the discount factor . The
comparative statics results, developed below, discuss in detail how the size of E the depends on
such free parameters. The new bound imposed on the discount rate arises from the consumers
demand. Thus, such condition would only discipline the time preferences of the consumers, if
those could di¤er from time preferences of the rms. However, even when the two coincide, the
restriction imposed on  remains independent of the number of rms in the market.
Before proceeding to the next section, for notational convenience, dene ({) as the unique
positive root of the following quadratic equation:
R1(({);{) = R0(({);{)
if such a solution exists in [0; 1], and set ({) = 1 otherwise. The details of the derivation
of ({) and the proof of uniqueness are deferred to appendix B. Further, dene ({) as the
smallest discount for which consumers with access to storage would purchase { units in periods
of sales when the regular markup is set at the monopoly level  = (v   c)=c:
({) =
v
v   c
{ 1   c
v   c
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3 Single-Unit Storage and the Prot-Stability Trade-O¤
For sake of tractability this section considers environments in which consumers can store at most
a single unit, S = 1. We do so, since most qualitative results are una¤ected by this assumption.
Part of the extensions section is devoted to generalizing to arbitrary storage capacities. The
section compares sale strategies in S in terms of prots and stability, and shows that a trade-o¤
can emerge between the two. The next two propositions characterize two strategies particular
strategies in E . The former will be the most stable sale strategy, while the latter will be the
most protable of all the sale strategies in E . Whenever the two strategies do not coincide, a
trade-o¤ between cartel prots and stability will emerge. The section proceeds with to explicit
characterization of the prot-stability trade-o¤ and to several comparative statics.
To simplify notation in this section let  = 0 and  = c=(v   c). Trivially observe that
S = 1 implies that { = 2 for any policy in E . Note that given the stated assumptions and
denitions, (2) and (2) respectively satisfy:
(2) = min f1; g
(2) = (1 + )  
where  is the unique positive root of the following quadratic equation:
2 (2  )     (1  )  2 = 0
If E is non-empty, the most stable sale strategy is characterized by the following result.
Proposition 7 If E 6= ;, no strategy in S is strictly more stable than strategy  2 E:
  {
1= min f(2); (2)g 2
Moreover,  is the most protable of all the strategies in S with equal stability.
Such a strategy requires rms to set collusive markups in periods without sales and uniquely pins
down the optimal discount for the remaining periods. The monopoly markup can be charged
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in periods without sales since  has no e¤ect on the stability. The optimal sales discount 
is chosen to minimize min fR0(); R1()g within the feasible set  2 [= (2  ) ;  (1 + )  ]
and crucially depends on the fraction of consumers with storage and on the monopoly markup
in the economy. The comparative statics section discusses such dependence in detail. Notice
that the optimal sale strategy may depend on all the parameters of the model except for n,
since both (2) and (2) are independent of n. Thus, the largest number of rms n() willing
to collude on any strategy in S can be found by looking at:
n() =
R1(
)
1  
Even though such strategy is optimal in terms of stability, more protable policies exist in E .
The next proposition characterizes, the most protable sale strategy in E .
Proposition 8 If E 6= ;, no strategy in E is strictly more protable than strategy + 2 E:
+ + {+
1= (2) 2
As in the previous proposition the strategy requires rms to set collusive markups in periods
without sales. However, the prot maximizing sale discount is the uniquely pinned down by
the consumers storage constraint. Obviously, such a discount may be smaller than that of the
most stable policy , and no longer depends on the fraction of consumers with storage in the
economy. Hence, the upper-bound on the number of rms needed to a collude on + may be
smaller than for :
n(+) =
min fR1(+); R0(+)g
1    n(
)
The previous two propositions were meant to highlight the trade-o¤ that may arise between
prots and stability in such environments. The rst result in fact, showed that sale strategies
could be used improve stability at the expense of prots. Strategy  was proven to be more
stable than any other strategy without sales, but less protable than full collusion. Similarly
 was clearly more protable and less stable than the competitive outcome (i.e. the Nash
equilibrium of the stage game). The second result instead, showed that even within E prot-
stability trade-o¤s would arise whenever  6= +.
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Since S was xed to 1, a more stringent characterization of the prot-stability trade-o¤
within S can be derived. In particular, note that the previous propositions require that:
(1) increasing  can only benet prots and cannot harm the stability;
(2) increasing  can only benet prots;
(3) increasing  can harm stability if and only if  2 [(2); (2)].
Then, for xed values of , , and , consider a strategy (1=; ; 2). Let R() = mintRt(1=; ; 2)
denote its stability, let () = 0(1=; ; 2) denote its prots and let:
n() =
1
1  
R()
denote the maximal number of rms that can sustain such a strategy in equilibrium. Note
that () is strictly increasing, and thus invertible, in . Finally, for any prot level  2 R+
let N() = n( 1()) denote the maximal number of rms that can collude on such a prot
level while employing a sale strategy. If so, note that a trade-o¤ emerges between prots and
stability for  2 [(2); (2)]:
dN()
d
=
dn=d
d=d
( 1()) =
1
1  
dR0=d
d0=d
(1=;  1(); 2)  0
since the denominator is positive, while the numerator is negative (details in Appendix B). In
particular, the last expression implies that maximal number of rms that can sustain a collusive
sale strategy (1=; ; 2) must decline as prots increase. Further notice that any sale strategy
that raises more prots by setting  > (2) cannot be optimal in terms of stability, since a
policy in N exists that is both more stable and more protable, as:
1
1   > n()
Similarly, no policy setting  < (2), could ever be optimal, since it would simultaneously
reduce stability and prots. In fact, by continuity a sale strategy (; (2); 2) could be proven to
exist that is equally protable as (1=; ; 2), but more stable. For convenience let m = v   c
denote the monopoly prot and let  and + denote the prots respectively of the most stable
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and the most protable strategies in E :
 =


1 + 
+
2  
1 + 


(v   c)
+ =


1 + 
+
2  
1 + 
+

(v   c)
Note immediately that   +. The next proposition highlights the specic nature of the
prot-stability trade-o¤ for economies in which S = 1.
Proposition 9 If E 6= ;, for any prot level  2 (0;m] the maximal number rms that can
collude on  while employing a sale strategy satises:
N() =
8>>><>>>:
1
1  if  2 (+;m]
1
1 
(2 )
(1+) (v c) if  2 (;+]
n() if  2 (0;]
In the interval (;+], N() is decreasing and convex, and by construction satises N() >
1=(1 ). Thus, proposition exactly quanties the trade-o¤between prots and cartel size (sta-
bility) that di¤erent sale strategies imply. Such a trade-o¤ emerges since larger sales discounts
may favor stability, but certainly hurt prots.
Figure 1: The left plot depicts R1(;{) and R0(;{) as functions of , where
({) = 0=(S{ + 0). The right plot depicts the prot-stability trade-o¤N().
The left plot of gure (1) depicts R1(;{) and R0(;{) and shows that for any value of {
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a unique discount ({) exists which maximizes the size of the cartel. The right plot instead,
depicts prot-stability trade-o¤N() derived in the previous proposition.
To highlight the trade-o¤more explicitly consider an economy in which  = 0:95,  = 0:15,
v = 10, and c = 1. Notice that the maximal cartel size grows from 20 to 29 when rms collude
on the most stable sale strategy  instead of the monopoly strategy m. Prots however,
decline signicantly from 9 to 2 as rms need to price very aggressively during sales in order
to sustain collusion. The most protable sale strategy instead, marginally improves the cartel
size, but raises almost as much prot as the monopoly policy. The following table reports all
the relevant variables for the example discussed:
n    {
m 20:0 9:00 1:00 9 8
+ 20:5 8:72 0:94 9 2
 28:6 1:96 0:15 9 2
The next section develops comparative statics to highlight how changes in the environment
may a¤ect such a trade-o¤.
Comparative Statics
All the comparative statics are developed for the four relevant free parameters in the model, ,
, v and c. The rst preliminary result characterizes how the size of the set E changes as such
parameters vary. As expected, more sale strategies are stable both when many consumers can
store units, and when agents are patient. Increases in the protability of the market further
improve the ability to collude on a given sale strategy.
Proposition 10 The size of the set E decreases with c and , and increases with v and .
The result is proven by studying how the bounds characterizing the stable strategy set E vary
with the free parameters. A larger fraction of consumers with storage increases the size of E ,
since more sale discounts are stable at any frequency {. Similarly patience , and protability
v   c, increase the size of E , since the consumer demand constraint ({)   is relaxed when
such variables grow.
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A more compelling result characterizes how the prot-stability trade-o¤ is a¤ected by
changes in the free parameters. The next proposition explicitly characterizes this dependence,
and shows how equilibrium strategies are a¤ected by changes in the environment.
Proposition 11 If E 6= ;, for any prot level  2 (0;m] the maximal number rms that can
collude on  while employing a sale strategy satises:
dN() d d dv dc
 2 (+;m] + 0 0 0
 2 (;+] + ? +  
 2 (0;] \  6= + +   0 0
 2 (0;] \  = + +   +  
where dN()=d > 0 if and only if  > = (2m   ). Moreover, the cut-o¤ prot levels 
and + and the maps  and  evaluated at { = 2 and (2)  (2) further satisfy:
d d dv dc
d+ + + +  
d   + +  
d   + 0 0
d + 0 +  
The proposition shows that increases in patience (i.e. the frequency of interaction) may lead
both to larger equilibrium cartels at any prot level and to the persistence of the prot-stability
trade-o¤on a larger range of prots. Increase in the protability of a market (i.e. v c) instead,
were shown to increase the maximal equilibrium cartel size, but only for intermediate prot
levels, as the stability both of the most stable strategy  and of the monopoly strategy m
were proven to be independent of values and costs. Increases in the protability of a market
were also proven to increase the range of prots for which the prot-stability trade-o¤ persists.
Finally, increasing the fraction of consumers without storage (i.e. ) was proven to reduce the
stability of the most stable sale strategy  as intertemporal linking between decisions would
decline. The e¤ect of such a change on the maximal cartel size at intermediate prot values
was instead, proven ambiguous, as a large fraction of consumer with storage could lead to a
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decline in equilibrium prots due to the cost of anticipating production. Clearly such a change
would have no e¤ect on the stability of strategies without sales. However, the range of prots
for which the prot-stability trade-o¤ exists would decline in  and would eventually vanish
at some value  < 1. Note that the discount o¤ered during a period with sales (i.e. 1   )
in the most protable policy + declines with patience and protability and is una¤ected by
the fraction of consumers with storage. The discount o¤ered in the most stable strategy 
(when such strategy does not coincide with +) instead, grows with patience and the fraction
of consumers with storage and is una¤ected by protability. Figure 2 below provides a visual
characterization of the comparative statics results presented in the previous proposition.
Figure 2: Comparative statics on the trade-o¤N() with respect to an increase: in  (top left), in
 (top right), in v (bottom left), and in c (bottom right).
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4 Multi-Unit Storage and Asynchronized Sales
This section considers two extensions of the baseline model. In the rst consumers have access
to multi-unit storage technologies, S > 1, while in the second rms compete in multiple markets.
General Storage S > 1
The rst extension characterizes the optimal timing of sales, and highlights that access to multi-
unit storage technologies can reduce the prot-stability trade-o¤. This will be the case: since
the most stable sale strategy may both display infrequent sales and be both more protable,
than the most stable policy with frequency 2; and because the most protable sale strategy
will not be a¤ected by the change in storage constraints.
As in the previous section, the next two propositions characterize the most stable and
the most protable sale strategies in E . For convenience, let us identify two particular sale
frequencies which will be employed in the characterization of the most stable sale strategies:
{ = arg max
{2f2;:::;S+1g
R0(({);{) s.t. ({)  ({)
{ = arg min
{2f2;:::;S+1g
{ s.t. ({)  ({)
Proposition 12 Assume that E 6= ;. If { is dened and if R0(({); {) > R1(({); {) when-
ever { is also dened, then no strategy in S is strictly more stable than strategy  2 E:
  {
1= ({) {
otherwise, no strategy in S is strictly more stable than strategy  2 E:
  {
1= ({) {
Moreover,  is the most protable of all the strategies in S with equal stability.
Such a strategy requires rms to set collusive markups in periods without sales and uniquely
pins down the optimal discount for the remaining periods. Compared to the policy found in the
previous section, the most stable strategy may display less frequent sales, { > 2. In particular,
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a necessary condition for this phenomenon to occur is that the critical ratio, R0(({);{), be
increasing with { at { = 2. The optimal sales discount and the optimal frequency of sales
crucially depend on the fraction of consumers with storage, on the discount rate, and on the
monopoly markup in the economy. In many common scenarios, the sale strategy  can be
simplied to (1=; ({   1); {   1) if { > 2, and to (1=; (2); 2) otherwise.
The most protable sale strategy in E remains una¤ected when consumers can store multiple
units and thus, the proposition characterizing such strategy coincides with the one presented
in the previous section.
Proposition 13 If E 6= ;, no strategy in E is strictly more protable than strategy + 2 E:
+ + {+
1= (2) 2
The prot maximizing sale strategy cannot change even if consumers can store multiple units,
since a lower sales frequency would lead to a bigger discount and thus to lower prots. Again,
the optimal sales discount is the uniquely pinned down by the consumers storage constraint.
As in the previous section, such propositions would display the prot-stability trade-o¤
for this more general environment. The rst result in fact, showed that sale strategies with
infrequent sales could be used to further improve stability at the expense of prots. In fact,
strategy  was proven to be more stable than any other strategy without sales, but less
protable than full collusion. Similarly  was clearly more protable and less stable than the
competitive outcome (i.e. the Nash equilibrium of the stage game). The second result instead,
showed that the prot-stability trade-o¤ would persist when  would entail infrequent sales.
The comparative static results on the size of the set E developed in the previous section also
hold without further modications in this more complex environment. As expected, more sale
strategies will be stable: when consumers are more patient; when more consumers have access
to storage; or when the market becomes more protable.
Proposition 14 The size of the set E decreases with c and , and increases with v and .
Obviously, all the comparative statics developed in the previous section on the most protable
policy + hold without any further modication. As for the most stable policy , results would
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have to be adjusted to allow optimal frequency { to respond to changes in the environment.
However, results with a avor similar to the ones developed in the previous section would
hold at any given frequency {. We refrain from developing such comparative statics in full
generality as the additional intuition gained is limited.
To conclude this part of the analysis consider again the economy in which  = 0:95,  = 0:15,
v = 10, and c = 1. Suppose that consumers with access to storage can store up to thirty units,
S = 30. Notice that the maximal cartel size is achieved with infrequent sales which take place
every 21 periods. Maximal cartel size grows from to 37 when rms collude on the most stable
sale strategy (S). Since sales occur less frequently smaller discounts are necessary to sustain
the maximal cartel size. Hence, in this environment the prots of the most stable strategy (S)
can be larger than those associated to the most stable strategy (1) of an economy in which
at most a single unit can be stored S = 1, as is the case in the example reported below. Thus,
the prot-stability trade-o¤ can decrease when consumers gain access to more e¢ cient storage
technologies. The following table reports all the relevant variables for the example discussed:
n    {
m 20:0 9:00 1:00 9 8
+ 20:5 8:72 0:94 9 2
(1) 28:6 1:96 0:15 9 2
(S) 37:4 4:62 0:27 9 21
Multiple Markets and Asynchronized Sales
From the previous discussion, it may appear that coordination in sales is necessary to achieve
any stability gain. In contrast, we provide a simple example to argue that sale strategies do not
need to synchronized. In particular, we will argue that when rms operate in multiple markets,
sales do not need to be simultaneous and symmetric either within or across markets. Consider
a variation on the previously described economy in which there are two identical markets A and
B, each with a mass 1=2 of consumers, and an even number n  4 of rms operating in both
markets.3 Corollary 9 provides su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a stable sale strategy
3Notice that since markets are symmetric, since rmsobjective functions are not strictly concave, and since
returns to scale are constant, there are no stability gains due to the multi-market setup (Bernheim and Whinston
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k 2 E in each market k 2 fA;Bg. Each of these strategies still requires rms to charge the
xed markup, k, in almost every period, and to periodically hold sales by reducing the markup
to kk every {k periods. The most stable sale strategy in such an environment still prescribes
set k =  in each market k 2 fA;Bg. Such a sale strategy sustains collusion if in any period
t 2 f0; 1g:
n  1
1  
t(

A) + t(

B)
t(A) + t(

B)
=
1
1  Rt(
) (2)
since t(k) = t() and t(k) = t() for any k 2 fA;Bg.
Now consider a strategy  in which the markup in each market is xed to k = 
, but
di¤erent rms hold sales in di¤erent markets every { periods. In particular, consider a strategy
in which sales occurring along the equilibrium path satisfy in every period t:
(1) if mod(t; 2{) = 0, rms f1; 2; :::; n=2g set a discount A =  in market A and B >  in
market B, while all the remaining rms set B =  in market B and A >  in market A;
(2) if mod(t; 2{) = {, rms fn=2 + 1; :::; ng set a discount A =  in market A and B > 
in market B, while all the remaining rms set B =  in market B and A >  in market A;
(3) if mod(t; 2{) 6= 0;{, A = B = 1 for every rm in every market.
Note that any rm charging k >  in market k does not collect prots in that market during
a sales period. Also, observe that the total prot across markets is constant for each rm and
equal to the total prot achieved in case of simultaneous sales. Without loss consider period 0
and a rm i 2 f1; 2; :::; n=2g and note that:
0i(A) =
1
2

   x
1  x0 +
1  
1  2x [2 ({S + 0)]

c
0i(B) =
1
2

   x
1  x0 +
x   x+1
1  2x [2 ({S + 0)]

c
) 0i(A) + 0i(B) = 0(A) + 0(B)
Moreover, note that in any period t the deviation prots of each player coincide in each market
k with those of the most stable sale strategy since t(k) = t(k). The few last observations
in turn imply that strategy  is as stable as most stable strategy . Without loss of generality
consider the incentives to deviate in period 0 of a for a rm i 2 f1; 2; :::; n=2g holding a sales
1990, and Spagnolo 1999).
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in market A:
n  1
1  
0(A) + 0(B)
0(A) + 0(B)
=
1
1  R0(
)
which is equivalent to condition (2). Similarly, incentives to comply with the equilibrium
strategy remain una¤ected in periods without sales. Thus, maximal cartel size under which
a sale strategy sustains collusion remains una¤ected even with asynchronized sales. Hence,
an asynchronized sale strategy would strictly dominate a simultaneous sale strategy for any
arbitrarily small menu cost incurred by rms while changing prices.
The previous argument required the number of rms operating in each market to exceed
four. This was necessary, since the deviation payo¤0(k) would increase, if a single rm held
sales in market k, as k >  for any rm not holding sales. If so, the largest sustainable cartel
with asynchronized sales would smaller than with synchronized sales, as stability is inversely
related to the lowest price charged by a competing rm. Note that the straightforward extension
of the multi-market model to asymmetric markets would generate sale strategies which are not
synchronized across markets as well as within markets.
Let 1 denote the variant of strategy  in which a single rm has sales in market A in
periods mod(t; 2{) = 0 and in market B in periods mod(t; 2{) = {. Again consider an
economy in which S = 1,  = 0:95,  = 0:15, v = 10, and c = 1. Fix the threat discount of all
the rms not selling in a market k during a sales period to k = 0:2. As expected, the stability
of strategy 1 is smaller compared to  as cartel size declines whenever deviation prots grow:
n    {
m 20:0 9:00 1:00 9 8
+ 20:5 8:72 0:94 9 2
 28:6 1:96 0:15 9 2
 28:6 1:96 0:15 9 2
1 24:7 1:96 0:15 9 2
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5 Conclusion
The analysis presented a novel rationale for sales in an industry in which a homogeneous
storable good is produced by n rms, and sold to consumers with access to heterogeneous
storage technologies. In this context, the paper examined the e¤ects of heterogeneity in storage
on rmsincentives to hold periodic sales to support a greater degree of collusion. In such an
environment sale strategies were proven to strengthen the incentives to collude, as storage would
intertemporally link consumer demand and thus, reduce the short-run gains from a deviation.
In particular, in any stable equilibrium rms would charge in any period of sales a big enough
discount to induce all consumers with open storage capacity to stockpile a quantity su¢ cient
to satisfy all their demand until the next sale. Such behavior was shown to reduce incentives
to deviate both in regular price periods (as only consumers without storage would purchase
units in such periods) and in periods with sales (both because a lower price would be charged
in such periods, and because consumers with storage would reduce their demand if a deviation
were observed in the wake of an imminent price war).
The rst part of the analysis: characterized consumer demand; characterized the set E of
sale strategies which are more stable than any strategy without sales; and presented necessary
and su¢ cient conditions for the non-emptiness of such a set. The second part of the analysis
focused on single-unit storage and characterized the most stable and the most protable sale
strategies in the set E . Within such set a trade-o¤ was proven to emerge between collusive
prots and cartel size. Such trade-o¤ and its dependence on the environment were explicitly
characterized. Relationship between the optimal sale markdown and the environment was also
explored. The nal part of the analysis extended the baseline model in two directions. The rst
extension considered the multi-unit storage scenario, characterized the optimal timing of sales,
and showed that access to multi-unit storage technologies could reduce the prot-stability trade-
o¤. The second extension instead, proved that synchronization in sales would not be necessary
in multi-market setup.
In the proposed model collusion was strengthened at the expense of aggregate prots, since
deviation prots would decline more than equilibrium prots if sale strategies were employed.
Aggregate prots however, had to decline when rms held sales, as consumers were homogeneous
in their willingness to pay. Note however, that if consumers with higher storage capacity had a
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lower willingness to pay, a sale strategy could achieve higher prots than the no-sale strategy by
price discriminating among di¤erent types of consumers, and could thus foster collusion even
further. Valuations were kept homogeneous across consumers only to display more explicitly
the e¤ects of the intertemporal linking in consumer demand.
Finally, note that the rationality imposed on consumer demand required that all buyers
would understand the consequences of a deviation on future prices. This assumption could
easily be relaxed by introducing behavioral buyers who can only imperfectly forecast future
prices. All results would still hold qualitatively, even though the stability of any given strategy
may decline.
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6 Appendix
Part A: Proofs
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Remark 1 If pz  v in any period z  0, the demand for consumption good at time t:
(1) by consumers without storage technology satises d0(pt) = 1;
(2) by consumers with storage technology and with s units already in storage satises:
dS(s;p
t) = max

min

T (pt); S + 1
	  s; 0	
Proof. Part (1) of the claim is trivial. To prove (2) notice that by construction dS(s;pt) 2
[0; S   1 + s]. The upper-bound must hold, since no consumer can store more than S units.
The lower-bound must hold because no player can benet by disposing already purchased units
given that pz  0 for any z. Also notice that only proles of demand such that guarantee a
consumption stream of a unit in every period can be optimal, since prices satisfy pz  v. Thus,
payo¤ stream can be compared by looking only at the total expenditure on consumption good.
Then, consider the case in which T (pt)  S + 1. By contradiction consider a prole of
demand for the successive T (pt) periods, fdt+zgT (p
t)
z=0 and suppose that dt 6= max fT (pt)  s; 0g.
If so, there exists a prole of demands

d0t+z
	T (pt)
z=0
that costs less and that leaves the consumer
with exactly as many units stored in period t+ T (pt). In fact, consider:
d0t = max

T (pt)  s; 0	
d0t+z = 0 if z 2
 
0; T (pt)

d0t+T (pt) =
hPT (pt)
z=0 dz
i
  d0t
by construction the prole leaves the consumer with exactly as many units stored in period
t+ T (pt). Moreover d0 costs less, since:
PT (pt)
z=0 
zpzdz =
PT (pt) 1
z=0 
zpzdz + 
T (pt)pt+T (pt)dt+T (pt) 
 pt
PT (pt) 1
z=0 dz + 
T (pt)pt+T (pt)dt+T (pt) =
= ptd
0
t + pt
hPT (pt) 1
z=0 dz   d0t
i
+ T (p
t)pt+T (pt)dt+T (pt) =
= ptd
0
t + pt

d0t+T (pt)   dt+T (pt)

+ T (p
t)pt+T (pt)dt+T (pt) =
= ptd
0
t + 
T (pt)pt+T (pt)d
0
t+T (pt) +
h
T (p
t)pt+T (pt)   pt
i 
dt+T (pt)   d0t+T (pt)
 
 ptd0t + T (p
t)pt+T (pt)d
0
t+T (pt)
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given that: (i)
PT (pt) 1
z=0 dz  d0t & dt+T (pt)  d0t+T (pt), since that consumers consume one unit in
every period; and (ii) T (p
t)pt+T (pt) < pt  zpt+z for any z 2 (0; T (pt)). Thus a contradiction is
established. A very similar and omitted argument works also for the case in which T (pt) > S+1
and establishes the claim.
Remark 2 Strategy  is a SPE of the innite repetition of the game if and only if:
  1  1
n
t
t
Proof. The proof of the result is trivial. No player benets from a deviation along the
equilibrium path if:
t
n
 (1  )t
where t denotes the most protable deviation. Such condition is exploited to pin down the
requirement on the critical discount rate. Moreover no deviation can be protable o¤ the
equilibrium path, since all players make at most zero prots when all competitors quote prices
at marginal cost.
Remark 3 If mod(t;{) = 0, st = 0. If mod(t;{) = mod(z;{), dt = dz.
Proof. The rst claim is proven by induction. Note that mod(0;{) = 0 and s0 = 0. We show
that if the claim is true for any t  T such that mod(t;{) = 0 it is true for any t  T +{ such
that mod(t;{) = 0. In fact consider the largest date t such that t  T and mod(t;{) = 0. Such
date exists by the initial condition and the induction hypothesis. At such date the demand of
an individual with storage satises:
dS(0;p
t) = min

T (pt); S + 1
	
Moreover T (pt)  {, since (1 + ) > {(1 + ). Hence, dS(0;pt)  { and st < { given
that one unit will be consumed. Moreover, in any period z 2 ft+ 1; :::; t+ {g, since (1 + ) >
(1 + ) > (1 + ), we have that T (pt) = 1 and consequently:
dS(st;p
t) =
8<: 0 if st > 01 if st = 0 ) st+1 =
8<: st   1 if st > 00 if st = 0
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Which establishes that st+{ = 0, since st < {. The second claim follows immediately, since
from the previous part of the proof it is straightforward to observe that:
dS(st;p
t) =
8>>><>>>:
dS(0;p
0) if mod(t;{) = 0
0 if st > 0 & mod(t;{) 6= 0
1 if st = 0 & mod(t;{) 6= 0
(3)
Proposition 4 The following claims must hold:
(1) SnC = V
(2) N  V
(3) any strategy in N is more stable than any strategy in V;
(4) any strategy that sets  = v c
c
and  = 1 is prot maximizing within S;
(5) for any strategy in C, st = S(t) and:
dt =
8<: 0 + {S if mod(t;{) = 00 if mod(t;{) 6= 0
Proof. To prove part (1), we begin by arguing that SnC  V. Consider a strategy  2 SnC for
which the constraint (1 + )  { 1 (1 + ) is violated. By the demand structure established
in condition (3) a period exists in which mod(t;{) 6= 0 and dSt > 1, since d0S < {. Therefore,
every strategy violating (1 + )  { 1 (1 + ) must belong to V. Similarly, if { > S + 1 a
period would exists in which dSt > 1 and mod(t;{) 6= 0, and the strategy would again belong
to V. Thus, SnC  V. Further note that condition (5) requires C \ V = ;, and thus establishes
(1). Note that (2) is immediate, because  = 1 implies dS(st;pt) = 1 for any t as pt+1 = pt
requires pt > pt+1.
To prove (3), rst observe that all strategies inN are equally stable. Note that, by the proof
of (2), for any strategy  2 N equilibrium payo¤s simplify to t() = c. Thus, a deviating
player can capture at most such a prot by undercutting the price marginally. Any deviation to
a price y 2 (c; (1+)c), must satisfy d(st;yt)  1, since pt > c and thereforet(y; )  (y c).
Hence,t() = c andRt() = 1 for any t 2 f0; 1; :::g and any  2 N . Now, consider a strategy
 2 V and a period t in which dt > 0 and pt = (1 + )c. Note such conditions imply that
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st = 0 and dt  1. If so, by pt = (1 +)c, we get that t(y; ) = (y  c)d(st;yt) = (y   c), and
t() = c. Moreover, if such a period exists, it must be that:
dS0 = min

T (p0); S + 1
	
< {
because of the evolution of savings and demand discussed in the pervious lemma (condition 3).
In turn this requires that t 1(1 + )  (1 + ) > t(1 + ) for some t 2 f1; :::;{   1g. If so,
pick the smallest t for which (1 + ) > t(1 + ) and notice that:
t() =
(1  )
1  {
hP{ 1
z=0 
zdt+z
  (1  )S(t)d0ic =
=
(1  )
1  {
hhPS(t) 1
z=0 
z + 0
P{ 1
z=S(t)+1 
z
i
+ S(t)(0 + St)
i
c =
= 00t() + SSt()  c
where the last inequality must hold since:
0t() =

1  S(t) + S(t)+1   {

+ (S(t)   S(t)+1)
1  { c  c
St() =

1  S(t)

+ t(S(t)   S(t)+1)
1  { c =
=
 
1  { t+ t({ t   { t+1)
1  { c  c ,  
 
1  t
t(1  )
The inequality bounding 0t() must hold, since it cannot be protable to cut prices on con-
sumers that do not alter their demand. The inequality bounding St() must hold instead,
since rms prefer to delay production costs and because t 1(1 + )  (1 + ) requires:
  1 + 
1 + 
 t 1 
Pt 1
z=0 
z
t
=
 
1  t
t(1  )
Hence, a strategy  2 V cannot be more stable than a strategy in N , since Rt()  1.
The proof of (4) is trivial. The proposed strategy raises a prot of v   c, since dt = 1 for
any t. No strategy in which dt = 1 for any t can do better, since v is the highest price that a
buyer willing pay for a unit of consumption. But any other strategy such that dt 6= 1 for some
t must satisfy dS0 > 1, by the properties of the demand function derived in condition (3). In
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turn, if dS0 > 1, it must be that (1 + )  (1 + ). Thus by (3), we get that prots can be
expressed as follows for some dS0 2 (1;{]:
0() =
(1  )
1  {
P{ 1
z=0 
zdz
  (1  )d0c =
=
(1  )
1  {
hh
0
PdS0 1
z=1 
z +
P{ 1
z=d0S
z
i
+ (0 + SdS0)
i
c
An argument similar to the one developed in the previous part of the proof shows that 0() 
c. In particular, write prots as 0() = 000() + SS0() and notice that for the same
reason described in part (3) 00()  c. Then let t = d0s notice that:
S0() =
 
t   {+ t(1  )
1  { c  c ,  
 
1  t
t(1  )
where the inequality bounding S0() is established by 
t 1(1 + )  (1 + ) as in part (3).
This establishes (4), since c  v   c is necessary for prots to be maximal by the properties
of the demand function.
Part (5) follows trivially from condition (3) and the demand functions of both types of
consumers discussed in the text.
Proposition 5 Any strategy in E is more stable than any strategy in SnE.
Proof. First we establish that a strategy E in is more stable than a strategy in N . Consider a
strategy  2 E . By denition of E ,   0{S+0 , and therefore we get that R1()  1 and that
for any t 2 f1; 2; :::;{   2g:
Rt() = 1 +
(1  )
1  { 
{ t

{S + 0
0
   1

 Rt+1()
Hence, the stability of a strategy in  2 E will be pinned down by the minimum between R0()
and R1(). Moreover, R0() > 1 since for any  and for any { > 1:
R0() =
0

+
1  
1  x
h
({S + 0)  0

i

 0 + (1  ){
1  x S = 0 +
{
1 +  + :::+ x 1
S > 1
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where the rst inequality holds since dR0()=d < 0. Which establishes that if a strategy 
belongs to E then it must be more stable than any strategy in N , since mint0Rt()  1. Since
any strategy in N is more stable than any strategy in V, what remains to be proven is that
any strategy in E is more stable than strategies in CnE . But this is immediate since  2 CnE
implies  < 0{S+0 , and thus R1() < 1.
Corollary 6 E contains a strategy with a cycle of length { 2 f2; :::; S + 1g if and only if:
{ 1  v   c
v
0
{   0({   1) +
c
v
(4)
Thus, if   v c
v
0
2 0 +
c
v
, then E is non-empty.
Proof. First, we establish that 4 implies the existence of a strategy with a cycle of length
{ 2 f2; :::; S + 1g in E . Let constraint 4 hold for some { 2 f2; :::; S + 1g. Take any strategy
that sets  = v
c
  1 and
 2

0
S{ + 0
; { 1

1 +
1


  1


(5)
at the given value {. The strategy obviously belongs to E . Moreover, such a strategy exists
since the interval in which  was chosen is non-empty, whenever 4 holds at {.
Next we establish the necessity of 4. Any strategy in E must satisfy 5 by construction.
Consider any one of these strategies, and notice that:

0
S{ + 0
; { 1

1 +
1


  1




0
S{ + 0
; { 1
v
v   c  
c
v   c

Since the non-emptiness of the bigger interval is equivalent to 4, we get that 4 being violated
prevent the existence of a policy with cycle length { in E . This establishes the necessity. The
last observation is a trivial corollary.
Proposition 7 If E 6= ;, no strategy in S is strictly more stable than strategy  2 E:
  {
1= min f(2); (2)g 2
Moreover,  is the most protable of all the strategies in S with equal stability.
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Proof. This follows from the proof of proposition (12).
Proposition 8 If E 6= ;, no strategy in E is strictly more protable than strategy + 2 E:
+ + {+
v=c  1 (2) 2
Proof. This follows from the proof of proposition (13).
Proposition 9 If E 6= ;, for any prot level  2 (0;m] the maximal number rms that can
collude on  while employing a sale strategy satises:
N() =
8>>><>>>:
1
1  if  2 (+;m]
1
1 
(2 )
(1+) (v c) if  2 (;+]
n() if  2 (0;]
Proof. First note that if  > + no strategy in E is more protable than +. Thus, no such
prot level can be sustained by a sale strategy belonging to E . If so, the most stable strategy is
one without sales. However, all strategies in N are equally stable by proposition (7) and thus,
N() = 1
1  for any such strategy.
Then suppose that    and consider any strategy (; ; 2) with prots . Note that
   implies that either    or   . Also note that a di¤erent strategy (; ; 2) exists
which raises exactly the same prots, since any prot level    can be obtained by picking
 2 (0; ]. Thus observe that strategy (; ; 2) is equally stable to strategy  = (; ; 2)
and thus more stable than (; ; 2).
Finally consider the case in which  2 (;+]. Note that for this to be the case it must
be that  < +, which in turn requires
 = (2) < (2) = +
Note that setting  =  is always optimal for both prots and stability. Thus, for any prot
level  2 (;+] a corresponding sales discount exists () 2 (; +] which sustains prot
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level . Such a discount is found by solving the following equality with respect to :
 =



1 + 
+ (2  ) 1
1 + 

c
) () = 1
2  


v   c (1 + )  

The value of N() in such interval can then be found by computing n(()):
N() = n(()) =
1
1  R0(
; (); 2) =
1
1  

()c
=
=
1
1  
(2  ) 
(1 + )    (v   c)
which establishes the desired result.
Proposition 10 The size of the set E decreases with c and , and increases with v and .
Proof. First note that by corollary 9 the su¢ cient condition for the existence of a sale strategy
with period 2 requires:
  
2   +
c
v

1  
2  

= h (6)
Further notice that such condition is easier to satisfy when the right hand side of (6) is smaller.
This in turn implies the desired results since:
dh
d
=
v   c
v
2
(2  )2 > 0
dh
dv
=   c
v2

1  
2  

< 0
dh
dc
=
1
v

1  
2  

> 0
The nal observation on  is trivial the left hand side of (6) increases in .
Proposition 11 If E 6= ;, for any prot level  2 (0;m] the maximal number rms that can
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collude on  while employing a sale strategy satises:
dN() d d dv dc
 2 (+;m] + 0 0 0
 2 (;+] + ? +  
 2 (0;] \  6= + +   0 0
 2 (0;] \  = + +   +  
where dN()=d > 0 if and only if  > = (2m   ). Moreover, the cut-o¤ prot levels 
and + and the maps  and  evaluated at { = 2 and (2)  (2) further satisfy:
d d dv dc
d+ + + +  
d   + +  
d   + 0 0
d + 0 +  
Proof. First note when  2 (+;m] the sign of all the derivatives of N() = 1=(1   )
is trivial. Next, consider the case in which  2 (;+]. Note that within such interval
 2 (; +] and:
dN()
d
=
1
1  
[2 (v   c)  (1 + ) ] 
((1 + )    (v   c))2 > 0 , 2 (v   c) > (1 + ) 
dN()
d
=
1
(1  )2

(2  ) [2 (   (v   c)) +  (v   c)] 
((1 + )    (v   c))2

> 0
dN()
dv
=  dN()
dc
=
1
1  
(2  )
((1 + )    (v   c))2 > 0
The second inequality holds, since  >  (v   c) and  >  together imply  >  (v   c)
(where the rst condition holds since 0 > 0 for the strategy to belong to E , and where the
second condition holds since  >  and since the only positive root of (2) satises  > ,
as explained in appendix B).
Before we proceed nal scenario  2 (0;], let us prove all the remaining results. First,
observe that d(2)=dv = d(2)=dc = 0, since both R0 and R1 are independent of values and
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costs (see appendix B). Further note that by the implicit function theorem applied to the map
(2):
 =
d(2)
d
=  R1  R0
R1  R0 =  
(1  )
 [2(2  )   (1  )]
 =
d(2)
d
=  R1  R0
R1  R0 =
( + 1) + 2(   )
[2(2  )   (1  )]
Moreover, note that d(2)=d < 0, since 2(2 ) > (1 ) by denition of ; and that in
the only relevant scenario (i.e. (2) > (2)) d(2)=d > 0, since  > (2) > (2) = . Also,
note that R1 > 0, R0 < 0, R1 < 0 and R0 < 0. The sign of the derivatives of the map (2)
follow trivially from its denition.
Then note that + and its derivatives with respect to the relevant parameters satisfy:
+ =

1 + 
(v   c) + 2  
1 + 
(v   c)
d+
d
=
2v + 2(1  )c
(1 + )2
> 0 &
d+
d
=
c (1  )
1 + 
> 0
d+
dv
=
2
1 + 
> 0 &
d+
dc
=  2  (1  )
1 + 
< 0
To compute the derivatives of , consider the case in which (2) > (2). Or else,  and +
and their respective derivatives would coincide. If so:
 =


1 + 
+
2  
1 + 
(2)

(v   c)
d
d
=
1
(1 + )2

  (2  )(2) + (2  ) (1 + ) d(2)
d

(v   c) < 0
d
d
=

   (2)
1 + 
+
2  
1 + 
d(2)
d

(v   c) > 0
d
dv
=  d

dc
=


1 + 
+
2  
1 + 
(2)

> 0
where the rst inequality holds since E 6= ; implies    (2  )(2)  0, and the second
inequality holds since (2) > (2) implies  > (2). At last, consider the case in which
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 2 (0;]. Suppose that  6= +. If so, (2) > (2) and therefore:
dN()
d
=
1
(1  )2 [R0 + (1  ) [R0 +R0]] > 0 (7)
dN()
d
=
1
1   [R0 +R0] < 0 (8)
dN()
dv
=
dN()
dc
= 0 (9)
where (7) is positive since R0 > 0 and because:
R0 + (1  )R0 = 

+
2
(1 + )2
h
(2  )  

i
> 0
where (8) is negative since:
R0 +R0 =
R1R0  R0R1
R1  R0 =
=   1
R1  R0

 (1 + )2
[ +  (2  )] < 0
and where (9) holds trivially.
Finally, consider the case in which  2 (0;] and  = +. If so, (2)  (2) and:
dN()
d
=
1 
1  22

2 +
2  


(1 + 2)+ (1  2)

> 0
dN()
d
=   
1  2
2
2
< 0
dN()
dv
=

1  2
2  

v > 0 &
dN()
dc
=

1  2
2  

c < 0
which concludes the proof.
Proposition 12 Assume that E 6= ;. If { is dened and if R0(({); {) > R1(({); {) when-
ever { is also dened, then no strategy in S is strictly more stable than strategy  2 E:
  {
1= ({) {
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otherwise, no strategy in S is strictly more stable than strategy  2 E:
  {
1= ({) {
Moreover,  is the most protable of all the strategies in S with equal stability.
Proof. To prove the claim it su¢ ces to show that  is more stable than any other strategy
in E . Consider any other strategy  = (; ;{) 2 S. First let us establish that if  2 E , then
the sale strategy ({) = (1=;min f({); ({)g ;{) also belongs to E and is more stable than
. Note that:
({)  0
S{ + 0
 { 1

1 +
1


  1

 ({)
where the rst inequality holds by  2 E , and the second since   1=. Moreover,
min f({); ({)g 2 [({); ({)]
since ({)  ({) given that R1(;{) < 1 < R0(;{) for any  < ({). Thus, ({) 2 E . To
prove that ({) is more stable than , rst note that the markup  does not a¤ect mint0Rt()
and increases ({), which in turn implies that setting  to its upper-bound cannot reduce the
stability. Then note that mint0Rt(;{) is single peaked in  2 [0; 1], since R0(;{) decreases
in , since R1(;{) increases in , and since R0(0;{) > R1(0;{) (see appendix part B for
detail). Also notice that the peak mint0Rt(;{) with respect to  is achieved exactly at
 = ({). Thus, if ({)  ({), no strategy with the same cycle length can be more stable
than ({). If however, ({) > ({), the most stable strategy must satisfy  = ({), since
mint0Rt(;{) increases in  for  < ({).
Next observe that by the implicit function theorem we get that:
0({) =  R1{  R0{
R1  R0  0
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Note that the denominator is trivially positive (see appendix B), and that the numerator is
negative since at  = ({):
R0{  R1{ = 1  
1  {

S

1  { 1 
0

+
{ 1 log 
1  {

0

  1


({)
  1

 0
where the rst term is positive since ({)  0={ 1, and where the second term is positive
since ({)  min f({); 0g (see appendix B for details). Hence, since 0({) < 0, there exists
a unique value { such that ({) = ({).
Let f({) = (({)=({)) 1. Note that for a sale strategy to be more stable than a strategy
without sales it must be that f({)  0. Furthermore:
@
@{
R1(({);{) =
{ 1   {
1  {

f 0({) +
log 
1  { f({)


 
{ 1   {
1  {

f 0({)  1  
1  { f({)


 
{ 1   {
(1  {){ [{f
0({)  f({)]  0
where the rst inequality holds since log      1, and the second since 1   {  { (1  ).
The third inequality instead, holds since:
{f 0({)  f({) = 1
({)

{0({)  {
0({)({)
({)
  ({) + ({)

=
=
1
({)
[log {(({) + 1=) + ({)(1  ({))  ({) + ({)] =
=
1
({)

log {

({) +
1


+ ({)(1  ({))

=
=
1
({)

1 +
1


log {
 
{ 1

+ ({)
 
1  { 1 
 1
({)

1 +
1


({   1){ 1 + ({)  1  { 1 
 1
({)

1 +
1


(({)  { 1)  1  { 1 < 0
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where the rst inequality holds, since log {  {   1, where the second holds trivially, and
where the last inequality holds since ({)  ({) is equivalent to:
{ 1  ({) + + 1

(1  ({)) > ({)
The last few observations together established that if ({)  ({) for some {, then increasing
the cycle length would only reduce the stability of the sale strategy ({). In turn this establishes
that setting { > { cannot improve stability.
Finally, note that, if { exits, no strategy with period { < { can be more stable than
(1=; ({); {) by denition of {. Thus, the most stable sale strategy will be either (1=; ({); {)
or (1=; ({); {) depending on the relative stability of the two.
The observation about prots follows trivially, since changing  and { would necessarily
reduce stability by construction of  and because  = v
c
  1 raises the highest prot and
cannot lower stability.
Proposition 13 If E 6= ;, no strategy in E is strictly more protable than strategy + 2 E:
+ + {+
v=c  1 (2) 2
Proof. By the properties of the time zero prot function discussed in appendix B, prots at
time 0 increase in , , and {. Thus, the most protable strategy in E with a cycle of length
{ must trivially satisfy  = v
c
  1 and  = ({), since { 1

1 + 1


  1

increases in . Thus,
(2) follows immediately since { is chosen by denition so to maximize prots in E and since:
@0(; ({);{)
@{
= 0
c(1  )2{ 1(1 + )
(1  {)2 log  +
S
c(1  )
(1  {)2

(1  {)({ 1(1 + )  1) + { 1((1 + )  ) log x <
< S
c(1  )
(1  {)2

({ 1(1 + )  1)(1  {) + { 1((1 + )  ) log x 
 S c(1  )
(1  {)2

({ 1(1 + )  1)  { 1((1 + )  ) (1  {) =
=  S c(1  )
2
(1  {) < 0
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where the second inequality holds log x  x   1 and the rest is simple algebra.
Proposition 14 The size of the set E decreases with c and , and increases with v and .
Proof. First note that by corollary 9 the su¢ cient condition for the existence of a sale strategy
with period { requires:
{ 1  1
1 + 

{   ({   1) +

1 + 
= h(; ) (10)
Further notice that such condition is harder to satisfy when either  or  increase since:
dh(; )
d
=
1
1 + 
{
({   ({   1))2 > 0
dh(; )
d
=
1
(1 + )2

(1  ){
{   ({   1)

> 0
Thus, the size of the set E decreases with both  and . To establish the comparative statics
on c and v, simply note that d=dv < 0 and that d=dc > 0. The nal observation on  is
trivial the left hand side of (10) increases in .
Part B: Derivatives and Signs
Recall that for any strategy  2 C equilibrium and deviation prots in the two critical periods
respectively satisfy:
0() =

0 +
1  
1  x [({S + 0)  0]

c
1() =

0 +
{ 1   {
1  { [({S + 0)  0]

c
0() = c
1() = 0c
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Derivatives at t = 0:
d0()
d
=

0 +
1  
1  x [({S + 0)  0]

c > 0
d0()
d
=
1  
1  { ({S + 0)c > 0
d0()
d{
=

1  
1  { S + log 
{   {+1
(1  {)2 [({S + 0)  0]

c > 0
d0()
d
= c  0 & d0()
d
= c > 0 &
d0()
d{
= 0
To sign d0()=d{ consider harder case, namely S = 1. If so:
d0()
d{
=
1  
1  {

1 + { log 
{
1  {

c  0
which is positive, since:
x log  = log x  1  1
{
Similarly, derivatives at t = 1, satisfy:
d1()
d
=

0 +
{ 1   {
1  { [({S + 0)  0]

c > 0
d1()
d
=
{ 1   {
1  { ({S + 0)c > 0
d1()
d{
=

{ 1   {
1  { S + log 
{ 1   {
(1  {)2 [({S + 0)  0]

c
d1()
d
= 0c &
d1()
d
=
d1()
d{
= 0
Again, to sign d1()=d{ consider harder case, namely S = 1. If so:
d1()
dx
=
{ 1   {
1  {

1 + { log 
1
1  {

c  0
which is negative, since:
log {  {   1
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Moreover d1()=d{ > 0, when 0 = 1. Thus, the sign of d1()=d{ depends on the fraction of
consumers with storage in the economy. Notice that the resulting critical ratios are independent
of :
R0() =
0

+
1  
1  x
h
({S + 0)  0

i
R1() = 1 +
{ 1   {
1  {

({S + 0)

0
  1

Derivatives at t = 0:
dR0()
d
=  

   x
1  x

0
2
< 0
dR1()
d
=

{ 1   {
1  {
 
{S + 0
0

> 0
dR0()
d{
=
1  
1  {S + log 
{   {+1
(1  {)2
h
{S + 0   0

i
 0
dR1()
d{
=
{ 1   {
1  {
S
0
 + log 
{ 1   {
(1  {)2

{S + 0
0
   1

where the sign of dR1()=d{ coincides with that of d1()=d{.
Notice that R1() R0() = 0 requires:
2

x 1
S{ + 0
0

+ 

1  { 1
1     [S{ + 0]

  0

   {
1  

= 0
Such condition always has unique positive solution which satises  2 [0; 0={ 1], since it is
negative both at  = 0 and at  = 0, and positive at  = 0=
{ 1. However, the solution could
in principle require  > 1. If so, the solution to the general program max2[0;1] mintRt() =
R1() will satisfy ({) = min f1; g.
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